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The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 This section of the act has
produced volumes of comment by lawyers and economists as even the
most cursory research will reveal. Most of the writers have at least agreed
upon a statement of the statute's basic purposes, but even as to this
point there is some disagreement. Stimulated by the discord among the
authorities, this article undertakes a reconsideration of the need for
section 16 (b), its effectiveness and the results it has produced.
I. Is SEcTIoN 16(b) NEEDED?
A. The Congressional Purpose
The purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent statutory insiders from
making short swing speculative profits by trading in the securities of their
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor
in Freshman Research and Writing.
1. For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be re-
coverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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companies.2 Congressional sentiment at the time of the statute's enact-
ment included a general feeling of outrage at the use of inside informa-
tion8 by corporate officials for personal profit. Illustrative of the evidence
which precipitated the congressional indignation which culminated in the
enactment of section 16(b) was the testimony of Albert H. Wiggin,
Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit
Corporation. Wiggin reported that he had sold a large number of shares of
BMT stock after learning that the corporation's regular dividend would
be passed, but before this news was made public.' After the news was
released the market price of BMT shares dropped dramatically at which
time Wiggin repurchased the shares he had sold before disclosure.'
Without the benefit of an economic analysis of this practice, or a study
of its pervasiveness, Congress adopted a preventive measure described by
its architect as a "crude rule of thumb."'6 The statute purports to accom-
plish its stated goal by deterring the conduct at which it is aimed. By
making certain profits recoverable by the corporation the incentive for
insiders to speculate was to be removed.7
B. The Theory of the Statute
Prior to 1934 corporate insiders were free to trade in the securities
of their companies without federal regulation. State regulation was
minimal8 and most states followed the rule that insider trading did not
offend the rights of shareholders.' Erosion of the majority rule began with
the case of Strong v. Repide, ° which held that a director and substantial
shareholder was liable to another shareholder from whom he had pur-
chased securities through an agent because his failure to disclose material
information relating to the value of the securities constituted a "special
2. Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on S. 84 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
3. Inside information has been defined as undisclosed corporate news which if disclosed
would substantially affect the market price of the securities of a corporation, and which can
be exploited by one privy to the information before public disclosure. H. MANNE, INsIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 55 (1966). Accordingly, "[i]nsider trading arises wherever
persons, including corporations, having fiduciary duties, purchase or sell shares and the trans-
actions are wholly or in part motivated by 'inside' information acquired in the performance
of their functions as fiduciaries." W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
2, 3 (1968).
4. Hearings on S. 84 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 3024-28 (1933).
5. Id.
6. Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on S. 84 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934).
7. Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and 9720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1934).
8. See generally Yourd, Trading In Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders:
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 133, 139-43 (1939).
9. Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373 (1931); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52
Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868); Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525 (1873). For a collection of cases on
this point see Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
10. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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circumstance."" Based upon the principle that inside information is a
corporate asset, more recent cases have held that trading for personal
benefit by insiders who make use of this asset is a breach of the fidu-
ciary duty owed the corporation. Because a fiduciary duty has been
violated, these cases hold the insider liable to the corporation as a con-
structive trustee for any profits realized in the transactions. 2
Section 16(b) was drafted to incorporate this principle into the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
[Section 16(b)] is simply an application of an old principle of
the law that if you are an agent and you profit by inside infor-
mation concerning the affairs of your principal, your profits go
to your principal. 3
Notwithstanding the origin of the statute, section 16(b) differs from the
common law approach significantly. First, it requires both a purchase
and a sale to trigger liability whereas either may suffice under the common
law. Second, the transactions must occur within a six-month period to be
actionable. Finally, actual use of inside information is not required.' 4
The theory behind section 16(b) deserves questioning.' 5 Its essence,
11. Id. But see Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933), which distin-
guished Strong from cases where personal dealings between directors and stockholders were
replaced by transactions impersonally conducted over a securities exchange without disclosure
to either party of the identity of the other.
12. Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Orea-
mundo, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968). The American Law Institute has
also approved this principle.
[If [a corporate officer] has "inside" information that the corporation is about to
purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him in
stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust
for the principal. He is also liable for profits made by selling confidential information
to third persons, even though the principal is not adversely affected.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 388, comment c (1957).
13. Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and 9720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934). Eight
years later the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission underscored this premise
as the heart of the statute:
The Exchange Act proceeds on the theory that the confidential information which a
corporate insider cannot help but have is information which in a real sense belongs to
the corporation, since he acquired it confidentially and in his representative capacity
as an official or principal stockholder of the corporation. Thus, this information is
regarded by the act as the corporation's property, not the personal property of the
insider to do with as he chooses. Since such corporate knowledge is the property of
the beneficiary corporation, any profits resulting from its use belong to the insiders
no more than does the inside information itself.
Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amend-
ments to Securities Act of 1933 and to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
1257 (1942), quoted in Diamond v. Oreamundo, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305
n.4 (1968). See also Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares,
46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 64 (1960).
14. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 385, 409-10 (1953).
15. Criticism of the theory underlying section 16(b) is not intended to all applications
of the theory. When used as a basis for the common law action for insider trading, it is flexible
and can be adapted to the peculiar circumstances of particular cases. For example, an agent
may, with the consent of his principal, engage in transactions with the principal for profit.
[Vol. XXV
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of course, is that inside information is a corporate asset which may not be
expropriated by an insider for personal use. Corporate assets, broadly
defined, include all property rights, tangible and intangible, belonging to
the corporation. To be sure, a reasonable argument can be made that
information about a corporation is property and thus a corporate asset.
However, to appraise the validity of the theory, this asset must be
characterized in terms of its value and utility to the corporation. Natu-
rally, this information has both value and utility to a corporation for the
performance of its economic functions as an operating business. However,
since corporations are legally restricted" from using inside information to
speculate in their own securities, and as a rule do not trade in their own
securities, it is at least arguable that the corporate asset of inside infor-
mation has no value or utility to the corporation for purposes of specula-
tion or investment. Accordingly, there is no harm to the corporation from
this expropriation of the corporate asset of inside information and its
attendant breach of a fiduciary duty. Moreover, the theory underlying
section 16(b) cannot, in this instance, call to its defense the general claim
that a breach of a fiduciary duty need not be accompanied by a resultant
harm to the principal 17 because the statute excludes other general rules
applicable to the relationship between fiduciary and principal. 8
Therefore, the legal premise which forms the theoretical foundation
of section 16 (b) does not survive the scrutiny of examination and appears
to be a groundless rationalization for the statute. However, more impor-
tant than the theoretical justification for section 16(b) is the broader
question of whether insider trading has a harmful or beneficial economic
effect.
C. The Scope of Insider Trading
The impetus for the enactment of section 16(b) included a desire to
protect outside shareholders and other securities traders from the alleged
See Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 539 (5th Cir. 1951). In contrast, consent by stock-
holders to transactions giving rise to liability under section 16(b) is no defense to an action
brought under the statute. See Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). Furthermore, changes in the common law rule would require delicate legislation or
judicial interpretation with probable far reaching consequences. Statutory change or abolition
of section 16(b) poses no equivalent danger of unintended sweeping reform.
16. Corporations, like individuals, are subject to Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 which forbids purchases or sales by persons possessing undisclosed material facts
which would affect the judgment of an outsider. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963). Accordingly, inside information has no speculative utility in the hands of a
corporation. For this and other reasons, corporations generally do not trade in their own
securities and when they do their motive usually is to fund employee stock option plans or to
fend off take-over bids by other companies. Kennedy, Transactions By A Corporation In Its
Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAW. 319 (1964).
17. Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U.S. 673 (1894); Schuhmacher v. Lebeck, 103 Kan. 458,
173 P. 1072 (1918).
18. Trading by insiders without the benefit of inside information would not be actionable
under general fiduciary principles. See the authorities cited in notes 10 & 12 supra. But section
16(b) imposes liability even if insiders are in fact innocent of the misuse of inside information.
Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 n.6 (2d Cir. 1967).
1970]
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abuses of insider trading. Reflecting upon instances such as the Wiggin
episode, the Second Circuit noted that:
the Congressional hearings indicate that [Section] 16(b),
specifically, was designed to protect the "outside" stockholders
against at least short-swing speculation by insiders with advance
information.19
Accordingly, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of insider
trading is meaningless without an understanding of the scope of the
practice. Only by weighing the extent of insider trading against its evils
or rewards can accurate conclusions be drawn about its value. It is
disheartening that so much zeal has been expressed by those who
deplore insider trading without the benefit of an empirical study of the
incidence of the practice.
If the inclination to trade is any indication of the volume of insider
trading, a recent survey retrospectively confirms the suspicions held by
Congress thirty-six years ago. The Harvard Business Review reports that
42% of the respondents to a questionnaire concerning the ethics of
American businessmen stated that they would purchase the securities of a
corporation that was a candidate for merger with their own companies.20
Admittedly, these businessmen would not be statutory insiders under
section 16(b) in this instance.2 Nevertheless, the hypothetical circum-
stances posed by the questionnaire are analagous to the types of insider
trading situations against which section 16(b) is directed. Furthermore,
the respondents did not consider insider trading to be one of the eight
business practices they would most like to see eliminated.22
Perhaps the most enlightening information concerning the propen-
sities of insiders to trade in the securities of their companies appears in a
recently published study conducted under a grant by the Ford Foundation
and a large brokerage house. 3 In the period from 1950 to 1960 the
trades (purchases and sales) of insiders in 30 companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange were studied. The greatest number of trades in any
one company for the period studied was 146.24 The least number of
19. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
20. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REV. 6, 16 (July-Aug.
1961). Fourteen percent of those polled said they would disclose the information to a good
friend; two percent said they would tell their stockbroker; and fifty-six percent said they
would do nothing. Id.
21. Assuming they were not officers, directors, or more than ten percent stockholders in
the target company, they would not come within the reach of section 16(b).
22. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REV. 6, 160 (July-Aug.
1961). Caution is urged in attaching significance to the replies to this question. It is plausible
to suppose that the respondents considered use of inside information unethical but less so
than other practices. For example, corporate bribery by gifts and favors was the most dis-
liked business practice. Id.
23. Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive And Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11
J. LAW & ECON. 35 (1968).
24. Id. at 40.
[Vol. XXV
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trades of insiders in any one company was 14.25 In 20 (two-thirds) of the
companies surveyed there were 50 or less trades by insiders.2 6 In five of
the companies surveyed there were between 50 and 85 trades. In the
remaining five companies there were between 94 and 146 trades for the
period studied. Interpolating these statistics, the average number of
trades for the period was 50 for each company or five per company, per
year. The median number of trades was somewhat less, approximately
36.5 per company for the period studied, or 3.6 trades by insiders pet
company, per year.20
According to those who conducted the study, these statistics
apparently demonstrate that insider trading is not widespread. Nor does
it appear to be of abusive proportions in particular companies at the
present time. Moreover, in view of the fact that the boards of directors,
officers, and more than ten percent shareholders as a group, in many New
York Stock Exchange companies number well over 100, the amount of
insider trading appears insignificant. Correlating this information with a
survey of mergers and dividend payments the researchers concluded that:
Our own limited study of mergers, dividend reductions and
increases, and earnings increases, etc., also failed to uncover
systematic exploitation of confidential information by insiders.
3 0
Despite the contribution this study has made, any conclusions drawn
therefrom must be made with caution. Present legal restrictions certainly
inhibit insider trading to some degree. Section 16(b) at a minimum dis-
courages some purchases and sales within a six-month period by statutory
insiders. Rule lOb-5 promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19341 further limits the use of inside information by
corporate officials for personal trading. 2 Whether insider trading would
markedly increase without these legal restraints is at least an open ques-
tion.
Another qualification of this study that must be acknowledged is that
25. Id.




29. Fifteen companies had 36 or less trades. Fifteen had 37 or more trades. Id.
30. Id. at 46.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
32. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). Commenting on this case, one writer has concluded that the amount of
trading by insiders was insignificant and did not justify the public uproar and administrative
zeal that followed. See Whitney, Section 10b-5: From Cady, Roberts To Texas Gulf: Matters
Of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAW. 193 (1965). A thorough discussion of Rule 10b-5 may be found
in Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication
Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. R v. 185 (1964). Other restrictions on the sale of securities
by insiders may be found in the Securities Act of 1933. Insiders who qualify as issuers or
underwriters under the Act must register their shares before sale may be accomplished law-
fully. See 15 U.S.C..§ 77(e) (1964).
1970]
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the researchers were unable to determine the usual volume of shares
traded by insiders.3 3 In 1,305 transactions by directors the mean purchase
was 244 shares.3 4 In 1,077 transactions by Imore than ten percent share-
holders the mean purchase was 863 shares. " The conclusion of the study
was that variances of great proportions in the number of shares traded
made accurate generalization impossible. 6 The inability to uncover the
normal volume of insider trades limits the value of the analysis. If the
relatively infrequent transactions of insiders involve substantial blocks of
stock it is likely that insider trading is substantial despite the small
number of actual transactions.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the survey dealt only with
New York Stock Exchange companies which are the largest most stable
group of corporations in America. If over-the-counter companies had been
studied, the findings of the study might have differed significantly. Most
companies in this almost limitless group of corporations are much smaller,
more volatile, and subject to less public scrutiny, attention, and regulation
than are companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. For these
reasons, over-the-counter companies are perhaps the most fertile territory
for insider speculation.
On balance, the available evidence suggests that insider trading is
not widespread. Although, the absence of a comprehensive survey requires
caution in the making of any evaluation as to the need for legal restraints,
it can be concluded that a compelling case has not been made to show
that insider trading is pervasive, widespread, or of abusive proportions.
D. The Effect of Insider Trading on Outsiders
Almost all who have discussed insider trading have concluded that
the participation of insiders in the trading markets, armed with inside
information, harms other traders. The most vigorous and articulate dissent
has come from Professor Henry Manne. Professor Manne criticizes both
his predecessors and his contemporaries for never pushing "beyond a
sense of moral outrage""7 in their condemnation of insider trading. Indeed,
the cornerstone of his analysis is that "[i] t is not enough simply to say
33. Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive And Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11
J. LAw & EcoN. 35, 39, 42 (1968).
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 42. It is not surprising that the mean purchase for more than ten percent share-
holders was higher than the mean purchase for directors. These insiders are large shareholders
by definition, hence it is understandable that they purchase larger quantities of shares than
do directors who frequently do not have large stockholdings in the companies they serve.
36. Id. Even if a normal or average number of shares traded could be established, account
would also have to be taken of the number of shares outstanding and the market price of the
shares. Clearly, no accurate comparison of the number of trades and the number of shares
traded can be made between a large New York Stock Exchange company with 10 million
shares outstanding and an over-the-counter company with 100,000 shares outstanding. Like-
wise, a transaction involving 100 shares of a $10 stock cannot be profitably compared with a
transaction involving 100 shares of a $300 stock.
37. H. MANNE, INSmER TPADInO AND THE STOCK MARKET vi (1966).
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that insider trading is unfair. If it is unfair, it must be unfair to some-
body."3 This writer agrees with that critique and adopts Professor
Manne's premise as a starting point for objective analysis.
The typical circumstance in which insider trading produces allegedly
harmful effects is where the insider, by virtue of his relationship with his
company, possesses information that will probably materially affect the
market price of the securities of his corporation once it is made public 9
For purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that insiders possess
information of a character that is likely to cause an upward price move-
ment when disclosed. It will be assumed further that the time and manner
of disclosure of the information is the same whether or not insider trading
actually occurs.40 The following then is a consideration of each class of
outsiders (non-insiders) and how they are affected by insider trading.
1. SHAREHOLDERS WHO DO NOT SELL PRIOR TO PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE
The existing shareholder, whether a long term investor or a short
term speculator who has purchased shares prior to the insider's entry
into the trading market and holds those shares until after the inside
information has been disclosed to the public is not harmed by the presence
of insiders in the trading market. The shares he holds will, after disclosure,
reflect the full value of the inside information.41 Therefore, existing non-
selling shareholders profit (or suffer losses) from the release of corporate
news whether or not insiders trade.
2. SHAREHOLDERS WHO SELL PRIOR TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
These persons are identifiable as those who, prior to public disclosure,
sell their shares to insiders and others seeking to purchase shares in the
insider's company. Opponents of insider trading have made the charge, as
criticism of Professor Manne's view, that these outsider-sellers, especially
those who sell to the insiders, are harmed by not knowing the information
known by insiders.42 Put another way, if outsiders knew what insiders
knew they would not sell their shares. This criticism is unsound. Dis-
counting for the moment the possible effects of the presence of insiders in
the market on the competition for shares and any influence that they
38. Id. at 93. Professor Manne relates the story of a classroom episode in which a frus-
trated female law student unable to logically defend prohibitions on insider trading stomped
her foot and shrieked, "I don't care; it's just not right." Id. at 15 n.42.
39. See note 3 supra for a definition of inside information.
40. Any contrary assumption would be indicative of manipulation on the part of the
insider. A full discussion of the dangers posed in this regard and the need for section 16(b) to
militate against this evil is not considered herein. For a discussion of the question of whether
insider trading contributes to or causes corporate manipulation, see H. M , INSmER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 147-54 (1966) (suggesting that it does not).
41. Id. at 60, 61, 106 & n.5.
42. See Painter, Book Review, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 146, 149 (1966); Poser, Book
Review, 53 VA. L. REv. 753, 754 (1967).
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might exert on the price, the outsiders would sell in any case because their
decision to sell is made for reasons independent of the presence of insiders
in the trading market. Even those who sell directly to insiders are not
harmed because the identity of the buyer is unknown. If insiders were not
present in the trading market those who sell to insiders would merely sell
to someone else.43 Although insiders may possess an advantage not pos-
sessed by outsider-sellers, the latter group are not prejudiced by the
exploitation of that advantage. Furthermore, if an outsider-seller did have
the same information possessed by an insider-buyer it would probably be
valueless because as public information it would cause a price increase
before he could take advantage of it.14 On the other hand, if public dis-
closure had not been made, possession of the information would make the
outsider an insider 145
Of more substance is the claim that outsider-sellers are harmed by
the influence of insider-buyers on the market price of the securities.
Without insider trading prior to the public release of information that will
materially affect the market price of the securities, the market price will
remain stable, all other factors being equal, until disclosure is made at
which time a sharp vertical increase in the price of the securities will
occur. 4 In contrast, the trading of insiders prior to public release of the
information will cause a gradual increase in the price of the securities that
will level off when it reflects the full value of the information.4 7 This rise
in prices will effect differently two groups of outsiders. First, outsider-
sellers who sell for reasons other than the price rise created by the pres-
ence of insiders in the market will receive a benefit they would not have
received in the absence of the inside trading. Second, outsider-sellers
whose trading decisions are a function of price may be induced to sell by
the gradual price increases caused by insiders. Hence these persons may
lose out on the full value of the profit they otherwise would have realized
by a steep vertical price increase." The harm to these price function
sellers is a direct result of insider trading. To measure this harm the
43. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 WIsc. L. Rv. 720,
723-25.
44. Id.
45. Of course, only statutorily defined classes of persons, officers, directors, and more than
ten percent shareholders, may be insiders under section 16(b). However, under Rule 10b-5,
persons who otherwise are outsiders, by possession and use of inside information become
"tipees" and may be liable as insiders under the rule. Kuehnert v. Texstar Co., 412 F.2d 700
.(5th Cir. 1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
46. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 87-90 (1966).
47. Id. One critic of Professor Manne has argued that insider trading does not have this
effect on stock prices. Rather, it is contended, insider trading is just one of many factors
influencing stock prices. See Kripke, Book Review, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 213 (1967). Ad-
mittedly, insider trading is just one more factor. However, all other factors being equal, it
probably does have the effects attributed to it by Professor Manne. If not, the conclusion
may be drawn that insider trading is insignificant and does not cause harmful effects on
outsiders as some writers have charged. See notes 48 & 55 infra and corresponding text.




degree to which the insider trading occasions a gradual rather than a
vertical price increase must be determined. This is a difficult measure-
ment to make that requires empirical study before conclusions may be
drawn with absolute certainty. However, reasoning from the premise that
the available information suggests that insider trading is insignificant
compared with total stock trading volume,49 it can be safely said that no
convincing evidence exists to show that insider trading substantially in-
hibits the otherwise vertical movement of stock prices. Moreover, the
realities of the marketplace indicate that even without insider trading
unintended and subtle leaks of inside information as well as differing
interpretations of publicly released corporate information generally cause
gradual rather than steep vertical price curves. 0
Even if it is conceded that this harmful effect is significant, no harm
is done in net economic terms because a corresponding benefit is produced
for outsider-buyers whose decision to buy is a function of price. Thus, for
each outsider-seller who is induced to sell by the gradual price increase
insiders may cause, there ought to be an outsider-buyer who is, for the
same reason, induced to buy. This economic equation attributed to insider
trading merely redistributes value between price function traders who are
speculators. 1 Since no economic loss is thrust upon any other class of mar-
ket participants, the practical consequence of insider trading with respect
to securities price curves is simply a readjustment of the market odds for
speculators who can adapt their actions to this economic fact.
In addition, another economic standoff is produced by the influence of
insider trading on the curve of securities prices. Those outsider-sellers
who sell for reasons other than price will receive a higher price for their
shares because insiders have forced a gradual increase in price prior to
disclosure. 2 If insider-buyers did not force a gradual increase in price,
these outsider-sellers would not profit at all from inside information be-
cause the price would, other factors remaining equal, remain at a stable
level until disclosure was made.59 Therefore, those outsiders selling be-
tween the time insider-buyers enter the market and the time at which
disclosure is made benefit from insider trading. By an equal amount,
outsider-buyers who purchase shares for reasons other than price will
lose because they must pay more for their shares. Rationalizations for
this allocation of profit and loss are discussed infra.
49. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
So. See W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 47-53 (1965);
S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 46-47 (1966).
51. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966); HETHERINOTON,
Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wisc. L. REV. 720, 724.
52. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966).
53. Id. This result has been argued as a beneficial by-product of insider trading as it
occurred in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. The presence of insiders in the market competing
for the shares of sellers willing to sell "at the market" was described as a favorable -happen-
stance for such sellers because the greater number of willing buyers ultimately produced a
higher price. See Whitney, Section 10b-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of
Disclosure, 21 BUs. LAw. 193, 201 (1965).
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3. NON-SHAREHOLDERS WHO DO NOT BUY PRIOR TO DISCLOSURE
This class of persons includes the vast majority of public investors.
Among them are all persons who are not shareholders in the companies of
insiders until after public disclosure of inside information is made, or
who never become shareholders in such companies. These individuals
suffer no economic injury because of insider trading. Of course, insiders
possess opportunities which are not possessed by the persons comprising
this class of investors, namely, the chance to profit by exploiting undis-
closed corporate news. Unfortunately this opportunity cannot by defini-
tion be shared with the investing public. Unless it is retained and used by
a few, inside information is no longer valuable. On the other hand, this
group of individuals cannot be harmed by insider trading. They lose
nothing if insiders trade profitably. They would gain nothing if insiders
did not.
4. NON-SHAREHOLDERS WHO BUY PRIOR TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Discounting for the moment the influence of insider trading on the
price movement of securities, these outsider-buyers, like the outsider-
sellers discussed above, make their investment decisions for reasons inde-
pendent of the presence of insiders in the trading market. They are not
harmed by their ignorance of what insiders know because they would
purchase shares even if insiders were not trading.
However, the circumstances differ somewhat when the effect of insider
trading upon the price movement of the securities in which insiders trade
is considered. Outsider-buyers who buy for reasons other than price will
be forced to compete with insider-buyers for shares prior to disclosure.54
The amount of harm these outsider-buyers may suffer is the amount by
which insider trading causes a departure from the vertical upward move-
ment which should occur without insider trading.5 If insider-buyers were
not present to bid up the price of the shares prior to disclosure, these
outsider-buyers would presumably be able to purchase shares at a lower
price and thereby realize a greater profit when public disclosure is made.
Subject to the qualifications made above with respect to the probabil-
ity that insider trading has little if any influence on the gradual upward
movement of securities prices because of the small amount of insider
trading that actually occurs,56 and the fact that stock prices generally
increase gradually for reasons other than the presence of insiders in the
trading markets,57 the harm suffered by outsider-buyers is a real one.
However, there is no net economic loss because outsider-sellers profit by
an amount equal to the loss that outsider-buyers may experience. If
54. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102-04 (1966); W. PAINTER,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADINO 354 (1968).
55. See note 49 supra and corresponding text.
56. Id.
57. Se note So supra.
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insiders gradually bid up the price of shares in which they trade, outsider-
sellers benefit to the extent that outsider-buyers suffer.
The obvious economic result of this situation is that insider trading
may produce an economic redistribution of profit and loss. This equation
is justifiable because it produces fewer large gains for outsider-buyers and
fewer large losses for outsider-sellers. Or, if both outsider-buyers and
outsider-sellers have either a gain or a loss, insider trading will moderate
each by producing an averaging effect between the two. Thus, outsiders
undertake less risk in their investments and speculations when prices move
gradually because the situation giving rise to immediate unavoidable
losses is eliminated by the insider trading. Accordingly, reduced opportu-
nity for immediate gains is also decreased. This phenomena may be
rationalized on the ground that it encourages investment by discouraging
speculation. Based on the notion that outsider speculation is more often
harmful than beneficial, this result is economically desirable.58
The limited class of outsider-buyers, whose trading decisions are a
function of price, will benefit from any moderation of the price curve
caused by insider trading. These persons profit if they are induced by
insider trading to purchase shares that will increase in price.5" Compli-
menting this benefit is an offsetting harm to outsider-sellers whose trades
are price motivated. This offsetting harm has been discussed supra.
E. The Effect of Insider Trading on the Securities Markets
As important as the economic effects of insider trading on particular
classes of individual participants in the trading markets, is the macro-
economic impact of insider trading on the securities markets. Section
16(b) was not enacted to interfere with the investment transactions of
insiders.60 Instead, the section was promulgated only to deter short-swing
speculation by insiders." The distinction between speculation and invest-
ment is made by the statute. Purchases and sales that occur within any
six-month period represent speculation. 2 All other transactions represent
investment.6 As used by economists, the term "speculation" may embrace
almost all securities transactions."4 But for present purposes the term will
be narrowed to mean trading by insiders that is motivated by the belief
58. See note 68 infra and corresponding text.
59. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 60-61, 106 & n.5 (1966).
60. SEC, STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 20(c) AND 32(b) OF THE SECuRITiES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND Section 4(l) oF
THE SEcURIT Es ACT OF 1933, Hearings on S. 1642 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1963).
61. Comment, Short-Swing "Purchase and Sales" Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61
Nw. U.L. Ryv. 448, 449 (1966).
62. Id. at 450.
63. Id.
64. Speculation has been broadly defined as the purchase or sale of goods with the ex-
pectation of gain solely from a change in market value not occasioned by the actual use of
the goods or their transformation into other products for re-sale in another market. See
Kaldor, Speculation and Economic Stability, 7 Rv. EcoN. STuDims 1 (1939-1940).
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that undisclosed corporate information when publicly disclosed will
materially affect the market price for the securities of the corporation.
It should be noted that this definition of speculation is the same as the
meaning heretofor attributed to insider trading.
The classical economic view regards informed speculation by insiders
as a beneficial economic force. Speculation of this kind stabilizes the
market by offsetting the excesses to which securities prices are susceptible.
Thus, informed insider speculation, according to the classical economic
view, helps to avoid periods of "plenty" or "scarcity."' If the market
price of a security is too high (or too low), entry into the trading mar-
ket by an insider-speculator will cause a price adjustment so that the mar-
ket price more accurately reflects the intrinsic value of the security."
The insider-speculator is able to perform this function because his access
to inside information vests him with superior market judgment not
possessed by outsiders.6 7 The outsider-speculator is willing to perform this
function because it is profitable for him to do so.
However, if insiders trade without superior market knowledge their
presence in the market will be destabilizing and will cause wider rather
than narrower price fluctuations.6 ' Therefore, it may be postulated that
speculation by outsiders is generally harmful because it is uninformed
speculation which does not produce stabilizing effects. Accordingly, it is
likely that outsider-speculation frequently exacerbates excessive price
movements rather than moderating them. Theoretically it would appear
that insider-speculation is beneficial and that outsider-speculation is
harmful.
Empirical studies verify this theory by demonstrating that insider-
speculators are superior forecasters of the value that the trading market
will ultimately place on securities. A study of insider trading in selected
New York Stock Exchange companies showed that after a "purchase" by
insiders, the mathematical probabilities favored a large increase in the
market price of the stock by a margin of 2.5 to 1,69 while after a "sale"
by insiders, the probability of a large price increase was 1.1 to 1.70 In
other words, the mathematical probability of a large price increase was
more than twice as great after a purchase by insiders as after a sale by
insiders. Although insiders are not clairvoyant, the study found that:
65. Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68
COLuM. L. REV. 260, 265 (1966).
66. Kaldor, Speculation And Economic Stability, 7 REV. EcoN. STUD s 1 (1939-1940).
67. This benefit of insider trading to the securities markets must be qualified by the
available evidence which suggests that the amount of insider trading is probably insignificant.
Accordingly, the benefits produced are probably of minor significance. See notes 23-30 supra
and accompanying text.
68. Kaldor, Speculation And Economic Stability, 7 REV. Ecox. SrmsEs 1, 2 (1939-1940);
Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 260, 266 (1966).
69. Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive And Sta4 tical Properties of Insider Trading, 11




When insiders accumulate a stock intensively, the stock can be
expected to outperform the market during the next six months.
Insiders tend to buy more often than usual before large price
increases and to sell more often than usual before price de-
creases.
71
Despite their finding that insiders were unable to successfully predict
price changes during successive time periods, the researchers concluded
that insiders are superior forecasters of large price changes in the com-
panies in which they traded.
72
Notwithstanding the overall market performance of insiders as a
group, the fact remains that some insider-speculators for a variety of
reasons exhibit inferior market judgment that has a destabilizing effect
like that produced by uninformed outsider-speculators. This fact is not
cause for alarm because these insider-speculators lose money as a natural
consequence of their bad market judgment. Unless they can correct this
weakness, they will be forced to stop trading.78
Dissent from the classical view centers around the notion that specu-
lation distorts securities prices away from intrinsic value because specu-
lators concern themselves with the forecasting of mass psychology rather
than fundamental factors such as earnings, growth, product innovation
and other corporate developments which reflect intrinsic value.74 This
viewpoint has been advanced as an explanation for the apparent relation-
ship between political news and the day to day movement of securities
prices.75 In the broadest sense this observation accurately depicts the
effect of speculation. However, this pattern of trading is the antithesis of
the trading conduct of insider-speculators. Insiders have gained the atten-
tion of Congress because they based their trading decisions on corporate
information; not on mass psychology.76 Therefore, even though outsider-
speculation probably does sway securities prices away from intrinsic
value, insider-speculation produces the opposite result.
F. Curtailing Insider Trading Without the Statute
The objection to insider trading which section 16(b) is intended
to remedy is the unfair use of confidential corporate information for per-
71. Id. at 52.
72. Id. at 38, 47.
73. It has been stated that no insider would continuously engage in fruitless and costly
speculation. See Kaldor, Speculation And Economic Stability, 7 REV. ECON. STuDms 1, 2
(1939-1940) ; Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 CoLum. L. REV. 260, 266 (1966).
74. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY or EmPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 153-
58 (1936).
75. Kaldor, Speculation And Economic Stability, 7 REv. EcoN. STuD Es 1, 8 (1939-1940).
It has been suggested that if speculators trade based on their expectations of what other
speculators will do, speculators could, by combining in monopolistic fashion, eliminate most
day-to-day market fluctuations. Id.
76. See notes 4 & 5 supra and corresponding text.
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sonal benefit. Assuming arguendo that this practice is for the reasons
commonly alleged, undesirable, section 16(b) is not necessary to accom-
plish the desired end.
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, has been inter-
preted to prohibit the conduct at which section 16(b) was aimed. Although
rule 10b-5 does not make all short-swing trading by insiders profitless, it
does circumscribe the use of inside information by insiders in the trading
markets.7" The Securities and Exchange Commission, primary enforcer of
rule lOb-5, has taken the position that the breadth of the rule's prohibi-
tions is almost limitless, so long as unfair advantage is taken of outsiders.
These anti-fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of
particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are
designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which
undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.7
In addition to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
rule 10b-5 confers an implied private right of action on injured parties. 9
Patently then, many of the alleged evils of insider trading come within
the ambit of rule lob-5.
The use of section 16(b) to produce the same deterrent established
by rule 10b-5 can only be defended on the ground that it is more practical
because, unlike rule lOb-5, ° the application of section 16(b) does not
require proof of the actual use of inside information.81 To be sure, the
section 16(b) plaintiff faces an easier task than does his rule lOb-5
counterpart. Under rule lOb-5 the insider may defend by showing that
although he traded prior to disclosure, he did not possess material facts
about the company, or that the facts he possessed were not material. These
obstacles to recovery, omitted from section 16(b), are desirable in view
of the fact that the objective of both provisions is the prevention of
insider exploitation of confidential corporate information. It is a just
result that those who have not partaken of the forbidden fruit escape
liability.
The problem of proof under rule lOb-5 is not as difficult as it may
seem. Any insider would be hard pressed to show that he was not aware
of material facts about the company such as dividend payments, acquisi-
tions and mergers, new product innovations, management changes, or any
fundamental change in corporate policy. In fact, proof of insider status
77. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
78. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
79. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
80. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).




at the time a material fact exists appears to raise an inference that an
insider had knowledge of the fact."2 On the other hand, proof of the
materiality of facts known by insiders presents a question of judgment
for the trier of fact. Although questions of this kind are often difficult, the
marshalling of information necessary to make this determination is rela-
tively simple. Materiality depends upon whether the average investor
would attach trading significance to the information.8 3 Evidence bearing
on the investor's behavior can be readily discovered without insider coop-
eration and cannot be camouflaged by insiders. The difficulties in as-
sessing information possessed by insiders as material or not is a better
burden for the law to assume than the responsibility for arbitrarily impos-
ing liability without regard for the presence of the alleged evil.
In brief, the only result added by section 16(b) is that it may ensnare
some who have not made use of undisclosed corporate information for no
substantial evidence exists to show that rule 10b-5 is too narrow or cum-
bersome to accomplish the goal section 16 (b) was enacted to achieve.
II. Is SECTION 16(b) EFFECTIVE?
A. The Effect of the Statute in Curtailing Exploitation of
Inside Information
The enactment of section 16(b) came amidst a feeling of optimism
about its chances for success. The Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency reported that the section would make short-swing transactions
by insiders "difficult or impossible." 4 Unfortunately, the landslide of
discussions that have followed in the wake of section 16(b) have included
little or no evaluation of the success this statute has achieved in attaining
its expressed goal. Notwithstanding the general unsupported claims that
the section has been a success s5 or a failure s8 no comprehensive empirical
study of section 16(b)'s effectiveness has been attempted.
Enforcement of section 16(b) may be by the corporation, sueing on
its own behalf, or if the corporation refuses or does not diligently prose-
cute, by any shareholder.8 7 In general corporations have demonstrated
reluctance to bring suits because of dangers posed to corporate morale,
82. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). One writer referring to the decision of the district court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case, 258 F. Supp. 262, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), stated that the required standard of proof
"leaves virtually nothing to be proved in order to win in a Rule 10b-5 action." Ruder,
Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implica-
tions of Texas Gull Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 872, 884 (1967).
83. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
84. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), quoted in Lowenfels, Section 16(b):
A New Trend In Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 58 (1968).
85. See Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 Micn. L. REV. 649, 650 (1964).
86. See Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend In Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNIELL L. REv. 45, 61 (1968).
87. See note 1 supra.
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the desire of other insiders to protect their own de facto right to speculate,
and unwillingness to proceed unless liability is a legal certainty.88 Like-
wise, there is little incentive for individual shareholders to initiate a suit
for recovery of profits which inure to the corporation. This is true despite
the fact that shareholders benefit indirectly from recovery, in proportion
to their stock holdings. The significance of these obstacles to enforcement
is revealed by the fact that until 1940 no section 16(b) actions had been
brought.8 9 During the next eleven years, only 31 suits were brought under
the statute ° In recent years however, section 16(b) has become more
popular among corporate gadflies, attorneys, and legitimately disgruntled
shareholdersY1
Despite increasingly zealous enforcement, section 16(b) probably
has not had a substantial impact on insider trading because its mechanical
objective terms may be easily avoided with a minimum of inconvenience.
It is precisely this feature of the statute which prompted Professor Loss
to opine that section 16(b) is the "most cordially disliked provision"92
of the securities acts. Most securities lawyers wink at section 16(b) as
they advise their clients on how to safely escape its grasp. The following
is a brief discussion of some of the more obvious ways in which corporate
information may be profitably exploited by insiders without running afoul
of the statutory requisites necessary to trigger liability. The potential for
and probable use of these and other devices to avoid section 16(b) forms
the basis of this writer's belief that the statute has not succeeded in ap-
preciably limiting the use of undisclosed corporate information by insiders.
1. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PURCHASE AND SALE WITHIN SIX MONTHS98
Section 16(b) was designed so as "not to interfere with an insider's
investment transactions."9 4 This distinction is ostensibly accomplished by
the rule of thumb which creates liability only if a purchase and a sale
occur within a six-month period. Presumably, unless an insider purchases
and sells within a period of six months he is an investor; not a speculator.
The economic validity of this premise is certainly open to question. The
88. See comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition Of An Alleged 16(b)
Violation, 1968 DUxE L.J. 94.
89. See Wagner, Deputization Under 16(b): The Implications of Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corporation, 78 YA.E L.J. 1151, 1165 (1969).
90. Id.
91. Liberal rulings with respect to attorney's fees have made the members of the bar
section 16(b)'s policemen. See comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an
Alleged 16(b) Violation, 1968 DUKE L.J. 94, 102-08. One attorney has found these fees so
attractive that he may accurately be described as a professional section 16(b) litigant.
92. II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1087 (2d ed. 1961).
93. A sale followed by a purchase within any six month period would also give rise to
liability. See note 1 supra.
94. SEC, STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 20(c) AND 32(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND Section 4(1) OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, Hearings on S. 1642 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1963).
[Vol. XXV
1970] COMMENTS 161
distinction is artificial because it ignores the insider-trader's intent and use
or non-use of undisclosed corporate information.
The broadly stated goal of preventing the unfair use of inside infor-
mation is frustrated by this attempt to differentiate between investment
and speculation. Obviously, as many commentators have pointed out, 5
an insider who has purchased a security may after six months and one day
sell the security without liability under section 16(b). The holding period
does not make insider trading profitless because the passage of six months
does not appreciably dilute the speculative value of the knowledge of
merger developments, dividend payment changes, new product develop-
ments, management changes, or fundamental alterations of corporate
policy. Furthermore, no hardship is caused by forcing an insider to hold
for six months for the reason that the preferrential tax treatment given
long term capital gains is extended only to securities that are held six
months or more.96 The significance of this fact is that in nearly all cases
insiders prefer to hold for at least six months before completing purchase
and sale of securities for reasons independent of section 16(b)'s prohibi-
tions.
In realistic terms, there are probably very few cases where insiders
cannot make profitable use of inside information because they must sepa-
rate their purchases and sales by more than six months.
2. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE DEFENDENT BE AN OFFICER,
DIRECTOR, OR MORE THAN TEN PERCENT SHAREHOLDER
The original draft of section 16(b) included a provision prohibiting
insiders from giving inside information to others." This provision was
omitted from the final draft because it was felt that it would be too diffi-
cult to enforce. 98 This omission is important because it permits insiders
in different companies to exchange information about their companies
without liability under section 16(b). By exchanging information with
each other, insiders may profit indirectly from the inside information they
possess.9 9 Professor Manne suggests that this technique is widely used
and that loosely organized information banks for "back scratching" pur-
poses exist between insiders.'00 While it seems a bit far fetched that this
practice has even reached a semi-organized state, it is plausible, if not
95. II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1088 (2d ed. 1961); Halleran & Calderwood,
Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 86, 115 (1959); Munter, Section 16(b) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934:
An Alternative to "Burning Down The Barn In Order To Kill The Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q.
69, 73 (1966).
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3).
97. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943).
98. Id.
99. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 28, 30 (1966); Munter,
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down
The Barn In Order To Kill The Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 73 (1966).
100. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 62-71 (1966).
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likely, that the practice does occur between small groups of insiders on a
limited basis. Moreover, even if the information is given gratuitously to
friends or relatives rather than in exchange for the inside information of
other insiders, the alleged evil section 16(b) seeks to prevent will still
occur if the beneficiaries of insider generosity speculate with the informa-
tion given them. Thus, the limited application of section 16(b) to officers,
directors, and more than ten percent shareholders patently allows frustra-
tion of its objectives by the simple device of exchanging or giving away
valuable undisclosed corporate information.
B. The Effect of the Statute in Remedying the Alleged Evils of
Insider Trading
Indisputably, section 16(b) purports to counter the alleged evils of
insider trading by deterrance;"'0 not by remedying its consequences.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that section 16(b) offers no relief to
those who have allegedly suffered from insider trading." 2 Recovery may
be had only by the corporation and the corporation has not been harmed.'0 3
Additionally, the sanctions of section 16(b) may be imposed only where
an insider has realized a profit. 0 4 Hence, if insider trading produces any of
the harmful effects it allegedly causes and no profit is realized there is
no liability to anyone under the statute. 5 Not only is there no remedy
available in this case, but there also is no penalty that may be assessed
against insider traders. Thus, if section 16(b) is at all successful in ac-
complishing its goal, the line must be drawn at the point where its deter-
rent effect becomes unpersuasive since it cannot compensate the alleged
victims of insider trading.
III. Is SECTION 16(b) UNDESIRABLE?
At the very least, judicial interpretations of section 16(b) have
surprised many lawyers and businessmen. Surprise has matured into the
criticism that "the statute has been extended by the courts, acting presum-
ably on the intent of Congress, to catch many transactions which Congress
undoubtedly had not the slightest intention of catching."'0 6 Apparently
101. Id. at 26; Painter, Section 16(d) [sic] oj the Securities Exchange Act: Legislative
Compromise or Loophole, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 358, 359 (1965).
102. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 26 (1966). However, out-
siders who trade with insiders in transactions that violate section 16(b) may benefit from
corporate recovery by the amount that the increase of corporate assets is reflected in the
market value of their shares.
103. See II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1088 (2d ed. 1961) ; Wagner, Deputization
Under 16(b): The Implications O Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 78 YALE L.J.
1151, 1163 (1969). More attention is given the question of whether corporations are harmed
by insider trading at page 156 supra.
104. See II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1088 (2d ed. 1961).
105. The meaning of the term "profit" as used in this context differs markedly from
the economic meaning of the term. See discussion at page 163 infra.
106. Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution and Trading
in Securities, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 86, 115 (1959).
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alluding to the ease with which section 16 (b) may be avoided in situations
where it was intended to apply and the complimentary danger of its
application to transactions falling outside its objectives, one writer has
remarked that "in recent years section 16(b) has become a trap and a
snare for the unsophisticated or the poorly counselled .... ,3o7
Congress probably recognized this potential when it granted the
Securities and Exchange Commission the administrative power to exempt
certain transactions. 0 8 Notwithstanding that authority, it is evident that
this preemptive power which has resulted in eleven administrative rules,"0 9
has failed to relieve many of the inequities suffered under section 16(b).
This follows since clairvoyance would be needed to anticipate all possible
hardships and even when an inequitable situation is forseen the adminis-
trative power of the Securities and Exchange Commission must acquiesse
when its exercise would conflict with judicial pronouncement. In short,
too much that cannot be undone has already been done.
On the other hand one observer has noted that in recent years many
courts have taken a more flexible stance in interpreting the statute."'
Recent cases reveal that some attenion is now being given to the question
of whether the conduct of the insider defendent was the type Congress
intended to reach."' Despite this judicial trend and the administrative
rule making power of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the pen-
dulum has already swung irreversably toward the inequitable conse-
quences of mechanical application. The following is a brief discussion of
some of these unfortunate results.
A. Computation of Profits
The most striking example of the unjust application of section 16(b)
is the method employed to compute profits realized by insider speculators.
Unfortunately, the statute itself offers no guide as to what Congress meant
by the words "any profit realized." The method of computation adopted by
all courts was first announced in the case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp."
12
The Second Circuit held that profits realized under section 16(b) are
determined by matching the lowest purchase price paid against the highest
sales price received, no matter how much time has lapsed between the
two transactions, if any purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) occur
within a six month period." 3 Thus, for purposes of computing profits real-
107. Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend In Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 63 (1968).
108. See note 1 supra.
109. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-1-11 (1969).
110. Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend In Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 45, 50, 63 (1968).
111. See e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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ized under section 16(b), the price paid when securities purchases were
made twenty-five or more years ago may be used as a floor and a current
sale as a ceiling if an insider has made any purchase of those securities
within six months of a sale. Punishment has been added to misfortune
where insiders have been held accountable for profits received in transac-
tions in which they actually suffered a substantial economic loss."
14
Legal writers have applauded the fact that little judicial sympathy has
been forthcoming in such cases based on the rationalization that this
construction merely maximizes the deterrent Congress erected to dis-
courage insider speculation. 115 Such reasoning is suspect because neither
the statute nor its legislative history suggest that Congress intended the
deterrent to exceed remedial and approach penal sanctions. In the first
place, Congress expressly rejected a version of the statute which included
penal measures."' Furthermore, the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended that corporate recovery approximate as closely as pos-
sible the economic profit realized. Discussing the situation where a corpo-
rate insider for personal reasons is forced to make a sale that would give
rise to liability under the statute, Thomas G. Corcoran, architect of section
16(b) said: "Let him get out what he put in, but give the corporation the
profit. 11 7 Moreover, the provision for administrative exemptions, which
recognizes the possibility of sweeping mechanical application to innocent
insider trading, strongly suggests that a harsh and inflexible computation
of profits was not intended.
A related question is whether an insider may be liable under both
section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 and incur double liability."" In this way an
insider trader could be liable to his corporation under section 16(b) and
also to the outsider with whom he traded. There is nothing in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or the rules of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission which expressly prevents such a result. The fact that actions
under the statute are brought on behalf of the corporation and that actions
under the rule are brought on behalf of an individual seems to suggest
that both actions can be maintained independently. Recovery by two
different plaintiffs for the same wrong does not appear to contravene any
general legal principle or stated public policy. Accordingly, it does seem
inequitable to cut off the rights of an outsider at any time within six
114. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951),
where despite an economic loss of more than $300,000, the defendant was liable for profits
under section 16(b) of over $300,000.
115. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange Act, 66
HARv. L. REv. 612-14 (1953).
116. Id. at 407.
117. 15 Hearings on S. 84, 56, and 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6430 (1934).
118. It is even possible for an insider to incur "treble liability" if section 16(b) and
rule lob-5 are applied to the same series of transactions. An insider could be liable to both
his seller and his buyer under rule 10b-5 as well as to his corporation for the same purchase
and sale under section 16(b).
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months by a second transaction over which he had no control.119 On the
other hand, accepting the theory of section 16(b), it would likewise be
inequitable and out of line with judicial interpretations of the term
"profits realized" to deprive the corporation of its recovery to the extent
that an amount was paid by the insider to an outsider pursuant to a
10(b)-5 judgment. Furthermore, the effect of the latter construction
would be to limit the application of section 16(b) to cases where a rule
10b-5 suit was not maintainable because the insider was innocent of misuse
of corporate information.12 0 This would be anomolous because misuse of
corporate information is the stated evil section 16(b) was enacted to
combat. 2'
This potential application of section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 to one
series of transactions makes both laws take on a penal character.12 2 At
least in the case of section 16(b), this result is contrary to the legislative
intent.'23
B. Attorney's Fees
Although section 16(b) makes no express allowance for the re-
imbursement of expenses incurred in bringing an action under the statute,
compensation for expenses including attorney's fees has been awarded
out of the fund recovered by the corporation on the theory that the
corporation must pay the reasonable expenses of one who has benefited the
corporation. 24 Awards of compensation to reimburse shareholders have
also been justified on the ground that such compensation may often
provide the "sole stimulus" for private enforcement.125 This is especially
apparent in cases where the benefit to individual shareholders from corpo-
rate recovery is infinitesimal. In most cases, vigorous prosecution can be
expected only by offering an attorney a potential fee of up to one-half' 26
of the amount ultimately recovered.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's attorney frequently finances the litigation
because he is the party most interested in the outcome. Such conduct is
akin to champerty even though it may not, in all cases, fulfill the technical
119. III L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1473 (2d ed. 1961).
120. Id. at 1473-74.
121. See note 1 supra.
122. See Munter, Section 16(b) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: An Alterna-
tive to "Burning Down The Barn In Order To Kill The Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 73
(1966).
123. See notes 116 & 117 supra and accompanying text.
124. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 231
F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 351 U.S. 974 (1956). Recovery of attorney's fees has been
allowed even though the attorney's client was not a party of record, Gilson v. Chock Full
0' Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
125. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
126. See Grossman v. Young, Civil No. 35-459 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), in which the plain-
tiff's attorney was awarded a fee of $42,500 out of a total recovery of $85,000.
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definition of a champertous bargain.12 Furthermore, the propriety of this
type of conduct is subject to scrutiny under state statutes128 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.' 29 In any
event, it may be stated that sound public policy does not favor the
maintenance of suits by attorneys for personal benefit in the name of a
client without a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation.
Nevertheless, courts passing on his question have reasoned that,
[p] resumably Congress is aware of the opportunity presented to
attorneys to finance suits for their benefit, but apparently it
regards public policy against proved and repeated violations of
fiduciary responsibility by corporate officers at the expense of the
public more detrimental to public good than the violation of
generally accepted ethics by attorneys."'
Weighing the evil of champertous agreements against that which section
16(b) was enacted to combat, the decision has been that "[w]hatever
the ethics of the situation, the purpose of the statute [should be] ful-
filled.")1
31
Enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission, instead of
by shareholders on behalf of the corporation has been suggested as a
solution to the dilemma which now exists.' Since no charge of champerty
could be made against the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
statutory purpose could be accomplished without ethical problems. This
alternative has been criticized on the ground that self-executing controls
are preferable to government enforced restrictions because the Securities
and Exchange Commission does not have the resources needed for effective
enforcement. 133 Although administrative enforcement would certainly be
inconvenient, the costs could be compensated by awarding the Securities
and Exchange Commission a small percentage of any recoveries. Unethical
conduct should not be encouraged by statute, especially where the ultimate
result is to compensate one who has suffered no harm. On balance, the
better course seems to be to eliminate private enforcement and its ethical
127. Champerty may be defined as a bargain by a stranger to a suit, by which he
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving,
if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. Small v. Mott, 22
Wend. 403, 406 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1839).
128. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 877.01 (1967); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 488 (McKinney
1968).
129. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETirics No. 10.
130. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 231 F.2d
843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 974 (1956).
131. id.
132. See II L. Loss, SEcURrrnIS REGULATION 1053-54 (2d ed. 1961). A provision similar
to section 16(b) has been recommended for Ontario. To avoid the "unseemly" practice of
suing only for the purpose of obtaining legal fees, the Ontario Attorney General has recom-
mended enforcement by the Ontario Securities Commission. REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN.
COMM. ON SEC. LEGISLATION 228-29 (1965).
133. See Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 CoiUm. L. Rxv. 856
(1963); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. R.v. 857 (1962).
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problems in favor of public enforcement, despite the inconveniences that
might be caused.
C. The Statute as an Offensive Weapon
Plainly, section 16(b) was intended to act as a shield against the
alleged evils of insider trading.'34 Imagination and corporate vengence
have demonstrated that the statute may be used as a sword as well. A
recent news story relates the method in which a target company re-
sponded to the unsuccessful efforts of another corporation to gain
control."3 5 In 1968 Gulf & Western Corporation acquired 750,000 shares
of Armour & Company. When the Justice Department blocked a takeover
effort, Gulf & Western sought a buyer for its 9.8% interest and arranged
a sale at a handsome $18,000,000 profit. Armour reacted by making a
public offer to repurchase 20% of its outstanding stock'36 at a price
substantially lower than the price at which Gulf & Western had negotiated
to sell, thus making Gulf & Western the beneficial owner of 12.5% of
Armour's stock and a statutory insider under section 16(b)."I To avoid
134. See page 146 supra.
135. The Conglomerate's War to Reshape Industry, TimE, March 7, 1969, at 78-79.
136. There may have been room to question the legality of Armour's repurchase of its
own shares. Limitations on the right of a corporation to repurchase its own shares to fend
off corporate takeover suitors may apply to these circumstances. See Kennedy, Transactions
By A Corporation In Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAW. 319 (1964). Questions of fraud under
federal securities laws may also have been involved. But see O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1964).
137. Because of the unique nature of these circumstances, the question of whether a
corporation may be made an insider by an issuer's repurchase of its own shares has not
been judicially established. Obviously, Gulf & Western was unwilling to risk a judicial test;
and it appears unlikely that other companies would gamble either. This appears to be a
prudent position for several reasons.
For purposes of the reporting requirements of section 16(a), one is a more than ten
percent shareholder if more than ten percent of the outstanding shares are held, exclusive
of any shares held by the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1970). Since transactions exempt
from section 16(a) are also exempt from section 16(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1970), it
may be inferred that transactions not exempt from section 16(a) are also not exempt from
section 16(b). Hence, it may be postulated that only outstanding shares are counted in de-
termining whether one is a more than ten percent shareholder for purposes of section 16(b).
Accordingly, Gulf & Western was a more than ten percent shareholder after the repurchase
by Armour because repurchased shares are not counted in determining the beneficial owner-
ship requirement.
However, it may be argued that Gulf & Western came within the exception to sec-
tion 16(b) which provides: "This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, . . ." See note 1 supra. Since Gulf & Western was not a more than ten percent
shareholder at the time it purchased Armour's stock, but became a more than ten percent
shareholder afterward, this exception may apply by analogy to the question of when the
percentage status must arise. Although no case has been decided on these facts, the leading
case on the meaning of the words "at the time of purchase and sale" suggests that the
exception would not apply to Gulf & Western. In Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
the Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of the district court which denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant was a more than ten
percent shareholder both at purchase and sale because the purchase brought his ownership
over the ten percent mark. Thus, it is not necessary to have been a more than ten percent
owner before the purchase. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors, Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.
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having all of its profits purged under section 16(b) 188 Gulf & Western
sold 150,000 shares of Armour stock at a price lower than that at
which it had previously negotiated to sell. This sale brought Gulf &
Western's ownership of Armour below ten percent, and it was then able to
dispose of its remaining shares without liability under section 16(b).39 at
the price it had negotiated. In sum, this tactic did not rob Gulf & Western
of all its profits in Armour's stock. However, the takeover was prevented
and the profit on the shares representing ownership in excess of ten percent
was lost.
This result is anomolous. By use of the clever ploy outlined above, it
is very possible that section 16(b) will ultimately be construed to allow
outsiders to be made statutory insiders involuntarily. 4 ° Conceivably, this
1956), motion for summary judgment denied, 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The
language used by the district court in reaching this conclusion suggests that an intervening
event, after purchase, which made ones holdings exceed the ten percent statutory norm,
would make the purchaser subject to section 16(b).
[I]f the words "at the time" are construed to mean "simultaneously with," a
shareholder would become subject to the provisions of § 16(b) as soon as his
ownership exceeded 10% of the outstanding shares. Id. at 960.
More support for the inference drawn from Stella, that Gulf & Western would not
come within the statutory exception, may be found in the district court's development of
the facts in its opinion denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
district court stated that the defendant, who was an original subscriber for more than ten
percent of the issuer's shares, lost his insider status when subsequent public offerings diluted
his interest to less than ten percent. Id. If one may lose insider status as a more than ten
percent shareholder, by an intervening corporate event, it seems reasonable that when one
gains insider status as a more than ten percent shareholder by similar means, such status
will be read back to the time of purchase.
Further verification may be found in section 16(a). That section provides that "Every
person who is . . . the beneficial owner of more than ten percentum . . . shall file . . . after
he becomes such beneficial owner . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(a) (1964). Thus, section 16(a)
applies to more than ten percent owners even if they become such by means other than a
purchase. Since Gulf & Western was not exempt under section 16(a), it probably was also
not exempt under section 16(b). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1970).
138. Gulf & Western could have easily escaped liability by waiting six months from the
date of its most recent purchase of Armour stock before selling. Had it done so, no claim
under section 16(b) could have arisen. The apparent urgency faced by Gulf & Western
could have been caused by the reluctance of its buyer, General Host Corporation, another
takeover suitor, to wait six months. See The Conglomerate's War To Reshape Industry,
TimE, March 7, 1969, at 78-79.
139. At the time of the sale of the 150,000 shares of Armour stock, Gulf & Western
was a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of the outstanding stock. If the other
necessary elements for liability under section 16(b) were present, any profits realized (see
notes 112-14 supra, and corresponding text) were recoverable by Armour. Since this trans-
action reduced Gulf & Western's holdings to less than ten percent of the outstanding shares,
the remaining shares could be sold without liability under section 16(b) since Gulf &
Western was not a more than ten percent shareholder at the time of sale. See note 137
supra.
140. Several cases have considered the voluntariness of an insider's conversion of
securities on the issue of whether such conversion is a sale within the meaning of the
statute. Compare Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959), with Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827
(1954). It appears unlikely that this argument would succeed for one involuntarily made
an insider, since the decision to sell within six months is voluntary. The defending insider
could only contend that the statute applied to him involuntarily, not that he was forced
to violate it.
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result could occur inadvertently, as well as intentionally, when a corpora-
tion repurchases a substantial amount of its shares. There is irony in this
situation, and it may well be the ultimate insult to the equitable applica-
tion of section 16(b). Is it logical that a provision enacted to militate
against the rewards of being privy to corporate confidences may be
susceptible of application to a corporation's most hostile and feared
enemy? Present public rebukes and government dislike of conglomerate
giants cannot justify this distortion of purpose which appears to be the
logical extension of previously decided principles of construction. Public
opinion and government policy alike are fickle. Even if they were not,
the inherent injustice of applying the statute to outsiders appears to be
inexcusable.
D. Deputization
The problem of who is a statutory insider has been one of the most
troublesome questions of interpretation under section 16(b). Especially
difficult has been the application of the theory of "deputization." Under
the statute, a partnership or corporation is an insider in another company
if a partner, officer, or director is an insider in that other company.
In Rattner v. Lehman,'4' a partner of Lehman Brothers, an invest-
ment banking firm, was made a director of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft
Corporation. During his tenure, Lehman Brothers purchased and sold
securities of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft within six months, realizing
a profit on the transactions. With the qualification that the result might
be different if the partner serving on the board of directors of the issuer
knew of the transactions, the court excused the partnership from liability
under section 16(b).142
Deputization, as a basis for holding the partnership liable because of
a partner's service on the board of directors of another company, was born
in the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand. The distinguished jurist
noted that:
[T]he only question is whether partners are liable for whatever
profits the firm may make, whenever one of their members is a
director, and only because he is a director. I agree that § 16(b)
does not go so far; but I wish to say nothing as to whether, if a
firm deputed a partner to represent its interests as a director on
the board, the other partners would not be liable. True, they
would not even then be formally "directors"; but I am not pre-
pared to say that they could not be so considered; for some
purposes the common law does treat a firm as a jural person. 143
The next time this theory arose was in the case of Blau v. Lehman,'
144
141. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 566.
144. 173 F. Supp 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368
U.S. 403 (1962).
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which coincidentally involved the same partnership defendant as in the
Rattner case. The basic similarity of the facts in Blau to those in Rattner,
and the additional fact that the Lehman partner joined the issuer's board
at the issuer's invitation prompted the district court to find no liability. 45
Noting that "there [was] no evidence of any deputization or other affir-
mative action by the firm . . ." and that "we do not see how any sort of
deputizing can make the partners or the partnership a 'director' within the
meaning of Section 16(b)," the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision. 46 Granting certiorari for the first time in a case involving section
16(b), the Supreme Court approved the theory that one may be deputed
to serve the interests of a partnership on the board of directors of another
company for purposes of section 16(b), but held that the facts presented
did not make out such a case.
1 4
1
The latest judicial pronouncement on the deputization theory came in
the case of Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.4 8 Conceding that a partner-
ship or a corporation may be liable under section 16(b) because it had
deputized a partner or officer, (although no case had been previously
decided which held that deputization had in fact occurred) the Second
Circuit held that the president of Martin Marietta was deputized to serve
on the board of Sperry Rand Corporation. The decision was based upon
six findings of fact which were substituted for findings of the district court
that were "clearly erroneous."' 14 9 According to the Second Circuit, Martin
Marietta's president was deputized to serve on Sperry Rand's board for six
reasons: 150
1. Martin Marietta's president approved all of the firm's invest-
ments;
2. Martin Marietta's president was in a position to acquire inside
information about Sperry Rand;
3. Martin Marietta's president was furnished inside information
relating to the business outlook at Sperry Rand;
4. Martin Marietta's president, in a letter of resignation from Sperry
Rand's board of directors, stated that it appeared to Sperry Rand officials
extending him the invitation to serve, that Martin Marietta should be
represented on the board because of its large stockholdings;
145. Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
146. Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1960).
147. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). In a vigorous dissent joined by Chief Justice
Warren, Justice Douglas argued that the decision of the majority permitted Wall Street
partnerships to reap the benefits of inside information without liability because the practical
effect of the decision was to make partnerships immune from section 16(b). Id. at 414-15.
148. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969). Two other cases besides those discussed herein have
mentioned the deputization theory. See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 239 F. Supp. 962
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. Int'l. Mining Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
149. This finding was made purusant to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1969).
150. Id. at 264-66.
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5. The board of directors of Martin Marietta formally approved its
president's appointment to Sperry Rand's board;
6. Martin Marietta had representatives or deputies serving on the
boards of directors of other corporations.
Away at last from the mechanical unyielding statutory terms of
section 16(b), the courts now have an opportunity, in applying the
deputization theory, to channel the application of the statute toward the
kinds of conduct it was intended to reach, and to exclude all other cir-
cumstances. Unfortunately, it appears that the first such opportunity was
bypassed because the Feder court did not define the test for deputization
or attach differing weights to the factors which influenced its conclusion.
Interpreting the opinion, it seems from the factual observations made
by the court, that any representation given a corporation or partnership
on the board of directors of another corporation by an officer or partner,
will amount to deputization. There is no apparent reason for this con-
struction as opposed to one creating liability only where an officer or
partner is deputed for the purpose of permitting his corporation to make
short-swing profits based on inside information. This latter construction
excludes all cases save those expressly made the targets of the statute.' 5'
The implications of the deputization theory, if construed as broadly
by other cases as it was apparently construed in Feder are great.
Corporate executives and other distinguished persons are becoming in-
creasingly reluctant to serve as directors because of recent monumental
changes in the liabilities of directors. 5 2 In fact, the existing shortage,
plus the wholesale resignations that seem likely to occur in the future,
have stimulated the formation of employment agencies specializing in the
recruitment of directors for frustrated companies.'53 Expansion of the
application of the deputization theory will make outside directors even
more relucant to accept positions and will force the breakup of many
interlocking directorships. 54 Although this may appear to be a relatively
harmless and unimportant problem, closer analysis suggests that the
American corporate complexion may be -significantly altered.
A recent Congressional report reveals that American commercial
banks have substantial representation on the boards of many of the
nation's largest companies. 55 For example, 49 banks had interlocking
directorships with 286 of the 500 largest industrial corporations in
151. It may be unnecessary to apply section 16(b) at all since rule 10b-5 may apply
to cases where a partner is serving on the board of directors of another company for pur-
poses of permitting his partnership to make short-swing profits based on inside information
conveyed by the deputed partner. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
152. The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
153. Id.
154. The Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
155. SUBCOMM. ON Domesnc FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CUR-
RENCY, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. 1 (1968) quoted in, Wagner, Deputization
Under 16(b): The Implications of Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 78 YAE L.J.
1151, 1168 (1969).
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America.156 One bank owned five percent or more of one or more classes
of stock in 401 companies.' 57 Another bank reported that it had 326
interlocking directorships with 278 companies. 5 8 Deputization under
section 16(b) may be found in any case where the trust department of a
bank trades in the securities of a company with which the bank has an
interlocking directorship. This may be especially cumbersome for large
banks which may face serious restrictions on their ability to freely make
investment decisions based only on the interests of their customers. 5 9
On the other hand, it may be argued that interlocking directorships be-
tween commercial banks and large corporations are undesirable. If this
is true, it is a matter for the direct attention of Congress and not for de
facto resolution through enforcement of section 16(b).
Investment bankers also have a substantial number of interlocking
directorships with public corporations. Investment bankers usually become
directors in connection with a public offering of securities in which they
are involved.6 0 To protect their reputations for underwriting good stocks,
and to protect themselves as market makers in the after market, invest-
ment bankers often provide companies with a sophisticated outside direc-
tor who can assist management.' 6' In the future, Rattner and Blau may be
limited to cases where the outside director does not in any way represent
his firm on the board of directors of another company. Any representa-
tion, no matter how innocent, may give rise to a finding of deputization
under Feder. Accordingly, a valuable service now provided by investment
bankers may be eliminated or seriously curtailed. On balance, thorough
study may prove this to be a desireable result. But as with the case of
commercial banks, the elimination of interlocking directorships between
public companies and investment banking firms should be the subject of
legislation, not judicial pronouncement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though it may be an overstatement, there is some truth to the
charge that section 16(b) benefits corporations and plaintiff's attorneys
who have suffered no harm at the expense of insiders who have caused no
harm. The admitted inability of this writer to measure, with precision,
the degree of truth in that claim is a handicap shared by all others who
have promoted, criticized, or defended section 16(b). What is needed to
accurately determine whether sound public policy requires or should
tolerate the statute, is a comprehensive joint study by lawyers and econ-
omists. It is hoped that this article will help stimulate further inquiry
and discussion along these lines.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id.
159. Wagner, Deputizatio-t Under 16(b): The Implications of Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 1151, 1170 (1969).
160. W. PAwNTER, FEDERAL REGuLATioN oF INSiDER TaRiNcO 62-63 (1968).
161. Id.
